IN SEARCH OF REALITY XVIII


Review III





A Study in Thought





by





Marius Heuff

@M.Heuff

Chapter 1

Content

The importance of a belief in the truth.
Philosophical niceties and the question of relevance.
The trade-off between flexible tolerance and a purposeful resolve.
The existential meaning of belief structures.
A comparison between human and animal awareness mechanisms.

It always amazes me, how dependent we are upon a conviction that we possess "the truth", or, rather, upon a belief structure we believe to be absolutely true. Obviously, to possess the truth is very important for us, but, this desire is less inspired by a search for beauty than by a need for power and mastery. If we are convinced, that we have the truth in our hands, or head, we rely, implicitly, upon these mental images that appear to us as an absolute reality, and, we are, usually, oblivious to any distinction between the reality "as it exists", and, the concept we have about this reality.

We assume easily, and, perhaps, necessarily, that there is no difference between the reality "as is" and the imagery we have about it. Any discrepancy would mean, that we do not really possess the truth, and we will not rest, until we have cleared away all doubts. Then, we are sure, once again, that we know the truth, and, any distinction between our knowlege of the truth, and the reality "as is", becomes irrelevant.

This is the reason, why a philosophical insistence upon the acknowledgement that all our ideas and beliefs are nothing more than a collection of mental images, becomes irritating to those, who rely completely and implicitly upon the absolute accuracy of their beliefs in the truth.

True, if I believe, without any doubts, that a certain knowledge or information is absolutely correct, any distinction between the truth and the imagery about it, becomes meaningless. Besides, the insistence that all knowledge is only a concept or mental imagery, makes no sense to those, who never question the reasons, why they believe in whatever is so obviously true for them. The belief in a truth, as well as the experience of this truth, fuse into an indivisible unit, and, a strong believer can only answer that he knows, and experiences, many times, that his strong convictions are completely true.

However, many of us have experienced the fact, that we can see and observe someone with a strong, or, even, absolute faith in a truth, which, we know, see and experience, to be completely wrong. Yet, at the same time, many of us feel, intuitively, or, we argue with varying degrees of persuasion in favour of the concept, that the mental imagery of a truth or reality perception must correspond, closely, with an absolute reality, because we seem to be able to predict, often, with a startling accuracy, what is going to happen in the immediate future.

Is it, therefore, meaningful to distinguish between a truth "as we know it", and, a truth as it exists outside, or apart from, the human mind? The principle reason for doing so, is the experience that our concepts about any truth are bound to change as time goes by, in spite of the fact, that these concepts allow us a great deal of predictability and mastery over our environment. Therefore, the distinction between a truth and our image of it may help us to remain aware of the essentially organic or biological nature of our existence, including our beliefs.

By being aware of the inevitable changes that are going to occur in our concepts about the truth, (either, in our own environment, or, in other cultures), we remain flexible in our adaptations, and, we may avoid a futile form of confrontation, based on conflicting beliefs. However, this same awareness must undermine, to some extent, the strength we derive from a faith in the absolute validity of our truths. By being somewhat skeptical about the certainty we appear to possess, we lose, necessarily, some strength of conviction. We obtain a certain flexibility and tolerance at the price of a weakened sense of righteousness and purposeful resolve.

Yet, there can be little doubt, that we have to be confident about the truthfulness of our concepts, because our need to grasp reality is so great, that we would, simply, not be able to function at all, if we would have to question, continuously, the reliability of our most fundamental beliefs, every time we had to make a decision. We have to be able to rely upon certain belief structures, but, we experience, also, that we may rely upon a more vaguely delineated system of judgement; an intuitive feeling, or, a judgement guiding our decision-making processes, without relying upon a clear and verbalisable imagery of the truth.

In all probability, the specifically human characteristic of relying, heavily, upon a consciously grasped and deliberately constructed belief structure, is, philogenetically, a very recent development in the evolution of the living organisation. We may be the only species on earth that relies, so heavily, on conscious beliefs to guide our behavioural choices. This process is quite different from learning to modify behaviour in the light of past experiences. All animals learn to do this, at least, to some extent, and the highly developed mammals and anthropoids rely very heavily upon their past experiences, as well as on taught behaviour-patterns, in order to maintain their viability. We have seen, that it is reasonable to consider the transmission of "taught behaviour-patterns" through the mechanisms of imitating parental behaviour, as the beginning of a process of "cultural transmission".

Yet, we do not have any clear-cut evidence to assume, that the non-human animals develop, within a natural setting, anything like a conscious awareness of "true" or "false". The animal learns and categorises its experiences according to the possibilities given in the structure and function of its organism, and, we may say, therefore, that the animal learns in a way that is genetically determined; similar experiences of similar animals under similar circumstances will lead to similar responses, but, not so in the human being.

The behaviourally flexible animal will react to the present circumstances in the light of its past experiences, as well as its interpretation of the circumstances of the moment. An animal will certainly recognise common events, objects, as well as other life-forms, and, it will react to these circumstances "in a natural manner"; with a reaction-pattern that is modified and shaped by its personal experiences, but, the reaction-pattern is, in essence, determined by the biological structure and function of the organism.

To a large extent, the same holds true for the human being, and, we have pointed-out, in the past, that human reaction-patterns are quite similar, especially, when we consider the patterns of behaviour that are closest to the genetically engraved, instinctive drives for the fulfilment of basic biological needs. However, we see, that the human being also reacts to his environment in accordance with a conscious reality perception of what he believes to be true, and these behavioural modifications alter, sometimes dramatically, the biologically given, instinctive behaviour-patterns of a human being.

We can easily agree about the observation, that human belief structures vary enormously, and, because of the inter-position of a belief structure between stimulus and response, we see, that human behaviour has acquired an additional dimension of variability. The inter-position of a belief structure between the incoming, or "afferent" processes of information-gathering and classification, and, the outgoing, or "efferent" patterns of our behaviour, acts like a filter in front of a photographic lens, because the belief structure influences, dramatically, the way we interpret reality. When reviewing human history, we see, how often this communally elaborated structure of beliefs may lead us astray, as we reflect upon the disastrous consequences of so many collective behavioural responses.

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Chapter 2

Content

Flexibility and viability.
Neurological systems of classification.
The range of recognition-patterns.

We should trace the development of conscious awareness a little more in detail in order to appreciate the enormous significance of our belief structures. Obviously, this added dimension in behavioural flexibility was an existential asset and represented an increase in viability, but, just like any other biological possibility that has been selected by natural pressures and developed by the search for increased viability, it would be wise to look for the price that was paid for this development. In addition to the usual biological trade-off, the evolutionary development of this extra dimension of behavioural flexibility holds the key to our understanding of the phenomena of conscious awareness and understanding, and, perhaps, the essence of being human.

All the complex animals are capable of extensive variations in locomotor behaviour, or "movements", in order to hunt their prey, avoid predators and find a mate, and, they have to be able to recognise many different categories of signals or sense impressions. This means, that, from an early stage in the development of the flexible animal life-form, the central nervous system was able to classify sense impressions, or incoming stimuli, into categories of similarity. The ability to group-together a series of stimuli or sensations that are similar, but not identical, implies, that the organism, or, rather, the central nervous system of such an organism is capable of abstracting common denominators from a large series of similar sensations.

If an organism would make use of a very narrow range of variability in the common denominators or features that make-up the population of a recognisable category, the occurrence of such a recognition would be rare, because of the marked degree of similarity, or congruence, required between slightly different sense impressions. Consequently, the faculty of classification and recognition would be less useful as a tool to find food or avoid predators. Such a situation would decrease viability, as well as adaptability, and, we see, that, those life-forms, which have been genetically most precisely adapted to a specific ecological niche, have, indeed, a rather limited range of variability in their ability to recognise categories of similarity in existence or event. The viability of such a species depends, then, heavily, upon the persistence of a rather narrow or specific set of circumstances, or, a narrow ecological niche. If this ecological niche changes drastically, the precisely adapted species is in grave danger of becoming extinct, because, as a rule, it lacks the ability to embark on another ambitious program of genetically encoded adaptations.

Of course, a particular ecological niche must have been present for a prolonged period of time, before the slow processes of genetic adaptation can shape an organism specifically for a particular ecological niche, and, the slowness of the genetic adaptation prevents the selection of a very transient niche or opportunity.

A rapid genetic turn-over in the form of rapidly maturing generations, favours penetration into a specialised way of life. For species' that are too slow in their genetic turn-over, or, not numerous enough in their population to make use of existence possibilities that come and go rather quickly, nature has experimented, audaciously, with a remarkable short-cut in behavioural adaptation. In stead of relying upon a precisely adapted organic structure and function, (under the instructions of the genetic code), nature began to experiment with the possibilities given by enlarging the range of behavioural adaptations during the life-span of a member of the species. As a logical corollary, such a species needs a marked elaboration and sophistication in its capabilities to recognise a large number of categories of similarities.

Coming back to the complex, behaviourally flexible animal, we see, therefore, that the need to recognise a large variety of categories of stimuli, becomes essential, and, we will later discuss, how this increasing range of recognition applies to the classification of events as well. If an animal has too wide a range of recognition, its focus of awareness becomes "blurred", because the chances of lumping-together sense impressions that may have a significantly different meaning or consequence for the animal, have then increased significantly. The usefulness of this capability of recognition deterioriates, therefore, to a remarkable extent. The animal becomes "confused", viability declines, and its contribution to the gene-pool may cease all-together.

Natural selection will favour, automatically, a certain optimum range of variability for the categorisation of stimuli. This range should not be so narrow, that the incidence of recognition becomes so low as to affect viability or usefulness, but, neither should it be so wide, that the organism makes frequent and, eventually, fatal mistakes in the selection of its behavioural responses.

The very fact, that an organism classifies a series of similar but variable objects, circumstances or events, as "familiar or similar", means, that a process of categorisation has taken place. A refinement in behaviour becomes possible, as soon as the organism recognises the fact, that the events or circumstances can be grouped-together as having, essentially, the same meaning, such as food, danger, a mate, etc. Later, such a category of similar awarenesses may be sub-divided into several sub-classifications. For this process, the organism has to separate from the original grouping, another regularly recurring distinction. This distinction becomes, then, the common denominator for the sub-group. Only a small difference has to be remembered, which functions as the organising principle for the classification of a sub-group, while a more broadly defined common denominator functions as the classifying principle for the main grouping of similar awarenesses.

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Chapter 3

Content

Animal behaviour and awareness.
The conditioned reflex.
Human interpretations when analysing animal awarenesses.

We are reminded, here, about the very similar observations we have emphasised in our discussions about the slow differentiation of concepts from a communal pool of notions and vague feelings, or, "proto-awarenesses". However, we are talking, here, about the physiological mechanisms of an animal that begins to react more precisely to its environment, and, we are not dealing, as yet, with the specifically human awarenesses that can be consciously represented by verbal symbols.

Yet, we may safely say, that, animals become aware of, and are able to recognise as familiar, a certain object or circumstance, if the brain is able to recognise or categorise an incoming sense impression by comparing it to an existing memory-trace. The automatic classification of an incoming sense impression, as well as its comparison with a relevant past experience, will trigger a behavioural repsonse that depends, to a remarkable extent, upon the existential meaning of this sense impression. The existential significance of a sense impression is determined at the time it is being compared and successfully classified or recognised.

If an animal sees another animal, that is, usually, recognised and classifed as "prey", or, as a source of food, the animal will go "automatically" into a pattern of hunting behaviour, unless it has just eaten. In many animals, the recognition of their primary source of food has been genetically encoded, but, in the more flexible animals, these categories are elaborated by learned behaviour; either, by imitating the behaviour-patterns of the parental generations, or, by relying on personal experiences.

An animal will go into a complex sequence of behavioural responses after the reception of an existentially significant stimulus. These behaviour-patterns are, partly innate, partly learned, and, partly, they are influenced by the circumstances of the moment. There are good reasons to believe, that such an animal experiences a whole range of feelings, perceptions, and, perhaps, even, "emotions", but the difficulty we have, when trying to analyse what is going-on within an animal, lies in the fact, that we have to work with specifically human concepts. We have to use human awarenesses and symbolic representations, whenever we try to understand the animal's awarenesses during behavioural responses that are very similar to our own.

We recognise familiar elements in the behaviour-patterns of many animals, and, we know, that these patterns are associated, in us, with certain feelings, awarenesses and experiences, which we have learned to communicate with each other in language symbols and mental images. To what extent, are we then justified in assuming that the animals will "feel" the same way as we would under similar circumstances? It is obvious, judgeing from its behaviour, that an animal is able to feel pain, fear, discomfort, etc., but, we know, at the same time, that the animal is not able to isolate the awareness of his feelings and sensations as a separate entity of awareness, and, it is certainly not able to give it a name and communicate this awareness as an idea or concept. The closer we come to the human animal in the evolutionary hierarchy of the living organisation, the more likely we will find some evidence for a rudimentary ability to communicate conceptual images, similar tot the way we communicate conceptual or verbalisable mental images.

We have seen, that the ability of the central nervous system to classify circumstances and perceptions into well-defined categories, must have developed early in the evolution of the behaviourally flexible animal organism, and, we can not visualise the development of complex locomotor behaviour without such an ability. This ability to classify and recognise is not limited to a categorisation of similarities in appearance. It is essential, that the organism is also capable to categorise similarities in occurrence or "events". If an animal has experienced a highly significant sequence of events, this experience will be etched with a measure of precision in its memory. If it recognises, in a subsequent happening, the beginning of a similar event, it will classify this event into the same category, and the animal will then automatically expect or anticipate a similar outcome.

The classification of items of existence and events in similarity of appearance and outcome, forms the basis for all complex animal behaviour, and, it has, also, become the foundation for our own ability to classify awarenesses in terms of cause and effect relationships. No hunt, flight, fight or mating would be possible, if the organism would not have the ability to recognise a series of stimuli as signals for the beginning of a familiar event, which can then be anticipated with a reasonable degree of accuracy.

On other occasions, we have argued, how strongly the human being anticipates the immediate future, whenever he is reacting to contemporary sense impressions. This ability to anticipate the immediate future is also based upon a comparison of incoming stimuli with those that have been experienced and classified in the past. The conditioned-reflex is a concept, that seems to lie at the root of all neurological function, and it has yielded to a rather precise physiological unraveling of the underlying mechanisms.

If a signal or stimulus is recognised by an animal as leading to a highly significant event, the behavioural response to such a signal will be based on an anticipation of what the outcome will be. If a non-significant or neutral signal is constantly associated with a significant result or event, the animal will soon "learn" to associate the neutral signal with the significant event, and this originally neutral signal will now have acquired "meaning".

These concepts have arisen, originally, from rather artificial laboratory experiments, but, they have, nevertheless, given us a clear understanding of the way an organism functions in the complex totality of inter-actions with its natural environment. The classification of similarity in existence and similarity in event, is the fundamental corner-stone on which all animal learning is based, including our own, and, we have good reason to believe, that it is now possible to follow these developments, logically and gradually, into the conceptual world of the human being.

An animal learns from experience, but, does it know, that it is has learned? An animal reacts to certain stimuli in a certain manner, modified by numerous influences, but, does it experience the feeling, that it is aware of what it sees or feels? Most likely, this is not the case. The difficulty with all these questions lies in the fact, that we transpose human concepts and abilities to a sphere of behaviour, where there is no clear-cut evidence that the processes of conceptualisation have taken place to any extent.

If we see a predator hunting for its food and reacting to all the movements of its prey, we can describe an enormously complex inter-play between the behaviour of the hunter and the hunted. We can be sure, that the hunter can "see" its prey, but, are we justified to call this perception a form of seeing or perceiving that is similar to our own perceptions? The hunting animal seems to behave as a very complex piece of biological machinery, beautifully efficient in adapting to the numerous nuances and changes in the fleeing prey. Undoubtedly, the hunting animal relies on the classification of past experiences into categories of similarities in circumstances and events, assisted by complex feed-back mechanisms that ensure the smooth progression of the hunt, and yet, we are at a loss to say, exactly, what such an animal experiences.

We are sure, that the predator is not able to give its prey a name, regardless, how familiar the prey is, and, in spite of the fact, that, many predators live in socially integrated groups and have developed some means of communicating the presence of food or danger. The subjective awarenesses of the animal are, therefore, "felt" by us in a process of "emotional analogy", or "empathy", as these events are observed in the behaviour of the animal.

It is natural, and logical, that we feel empathy, as well as sympathy, with the suffering of animals, because it reminds us about our own problems and miseries. However, if we are interested in clarifying, as precisely as we can, the question what an animal experiences, we have to take into account the enormous difference in awareness between a conceptualising and verbalising intelligence, and, an animal without the ability to conceptualise. There is a vast difference between an intelligence that works, continuously, with belief structures, and, an awareness that functions only along neurological or biological patterns of behaviour, without the ability to formulate conscious symbolic representations and without this ambiguous blessing of a verbalisable reality perception.

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Chapter 4

Content

The development of human awarenesses.
Similarities and differences with animal awareness.
The beginnings of conceptual awareness.

We may be able to advance the understanding of our conceptual peculiarities by tracing, as a likely hypothesis, the emergence of conceptual thought from the evolutionary developments we can observe in the primates and other sophisticated mammals. We have good evidence to believe, that the foundation of our behaviour is similar to that of the higher mammals, and, we may, therefore, begin by tracing the similarities between human and highly developed animal behaviour-patterns.

Just like the "higher", behaviourally flexible animals, we categorise our sense impressions into classifications of similarities, and, we too, react in relation to our environment, while seeking the food we need or the partner we want to mate with. We too, test the possibilities of existence within nature and the social surroundings, being ebullient, when successful, cautious or fearful, when rebuffed or confronted with danger. The human being, also, learns new patterns of recognition by associating an initially neutral stimulus with an apparently significant consequence.

The conditioned-reflex plays a role in all of us, as we feel our way through life, find a place in society, and react to a continuous, enormously varied and complex stream of sense impressions. It is amazing, how we are able to arrive, most of the time, at a viable behavioural choice. Natural selection would have weeded us out, a long time ago, if the experiment with flexibility of behaviour would have been a poor choice, but, it may well be, that the final judgement of nature's experiment with an individually evaluated choice of behaviour, (which is the essence of intelligence), still has to be made.

So far, we behave much the same as the animals around us, and, we could extend the enumeration of common biological features by describing the similarities of our general and special sense-organs, our muscular, skeletal and glandular structures, etc. We are an animal in our behaviour, as well as in our structure, and, even, in our central nervous system, we can not detect any differences between the nerve-cells of a highly developed animal and a human being. We are certainly justified to see ourselves as a complex piece of biological machinery, reacting to a variety of stimuli, and, we could come quite close to an accurate physiological description of man; yet, we know that man is more than what we have mentioned, so far.

Perhaps, we can get an idea about this remarkable phenomenon of language, or, the function of a cultural code in general, when we consider, how the animal is almost exclusively dependent upon receiving the natural physiological stimulus of a sense impression, before the activation of a memory-trace or recognition-pattern can take place. In essence, the animal can only be stimulated into a behaviour of hunting, if it sees an actual prey, nearby, and, if there are no significant circumstances to inhibit the hunting response. If the animal is satiated, satisfied, not hungry, it will hardly notice the prey at all.

Behavioural responses are, of course, not only related to the hunt. When the time is ripe, an animal will be responsive to sexual stimuli as well. Its mating behaviour will unfold, largely, according to its genetic instructions, and, there are many other cues from the surroundings an animal will react to; e.g., while exploring the possibilities of social dominance or territorial control, or, when reacting in accordance with the genetically encoded instincts of parental care and protective behaviour, which are aroused by the presence of helpless and trusting youngsters.

Yet, by and large, we can regard animal behaviour as a sustained and complex inter-play between stimulus and recognition patterns, which, often, becomes a beautifully efficient adaptation to a specific set of circumstances by a process of careful learning and making use of a wide-ranging repertoir of experiences.

However, once the stimulus disappears, the behavioural activity tends to slow-down, and the animal falls in a content state of drowsiness and sleep. Nowhere, do we have the feeling that the animal communicates with his neighbours anything more than emotional states. Anxiety or aggression may spread in a wave of synchrony throughout a herd or a flock, but, we do not see the communication of a specific awareness. There are no reminiscences of past experiences, nor a recognition or recall of a specific memory-trace through the use of an imitative symbol.

In the ability to evoke a specific memory-trace with an imitative symbol, we see an important amplification of the arousal mechanisms, because the categorising and recognising functions of the brain can be stimulated by a signal that does not come from an actual reality perception. By re-activating the memory-traces of certain events or circumstances with a "symbolic representation" of this event, the human being can recall the memory-trace of a specific event or circumstance, as soon as he recognises the meaning of this representative symbol or gesticulative imitation.

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Chapter 5

Content

Communal aspects of symbolic awareness arousal.
The difficulties of indicating the beginning of the human species.
The importance of the frequent, voluntary recall of memory-traces.
The need to categorise conceptual images.

A wave of recognition must have spread through the audience, when the first primitive "dance" was successful in recalling, at least, to some extent, the high-lights of the day, and, this simultaneous re-activation of a series of memories, together with a wave of associated emotions, must have been one of the most powerful stimulants for mental development mankind has ever known. Man had embarked on the road towards conscious image-formation and symbolic communications.

The implications of this development were enormous, because the communal re-living of common experiences, re-activated, every time, the relevant memory-traces of the individuals of a socially integrated grouping. These memory-traces were now sharpened to an extent, that had never been possible before in the evolution of living existence. The experiences became more deeply etched into the memory-banks of each individual, and, consequently, the clarity of the mental image improved and became standardised throughout the community. By the re-enactment of a happening with an imitative dance, gesticulation or vocalisation, the memory-traces of many experiences could now be recalled, frequently, and almost at will.

At this stage of our evolutionary development, the single individual was, probably, not capable of deliberately recalling a specific mental imagery on his own volition, because the symbolic representations of his mental images, as well as those of the other members of the small grouping, were, in essence, represented by a form of communication. We are visualising, here, an early period in man's mental development, where we can not speak, as yet, of a clearly developed ability to think. Of course, we are speculating, here, since we will never be able to reconstruct or research these developments, except as an illuminating excercise in possibilities, or, rather, as probabilities of occurrence, within our own contemporary minds.

By considering the development of gesticular mimicry as the earliest form of symbolic representation and mental image-formation, we should be able to trace a smooth transition from the pre-human animal, (with its biologically determined behaviour-patterns), to the conceptualising human being, who was beginning to develop an additional dimension in his behavioural repertoir.

Until recently, proto-man also reacted as the physiological capabilities of his brain and body dictated, and, his mental activities, including his perceptions and anticipations, were not significantly different from those of the anthropoids around him. As soon as the physical substrate of a sense impression had vanished into thin air, the memory-traces sank into his subconscious, and, he had no means of deliberately recalling these memory-traces into the focus of his attention. He was, just like the other animals, dependent upon the biological mechanisms of recall, which were set into motion by the recognition of an analogous stimulus, or, the occurrence of a similar situation, or event, in "real life".

Proto-man was not conceptualising as yet, and, he reacted as a biological machine towards his environment, in accordance with his genetic instructions. He reacted to the chance-happenings of his personal experiences, as well as those experiences he shared with the other members of the socially integrated group.

We should see the development of symbolic representations and speech communications as developments that took place, before the morphology and physiology of the human brain reached their present configuration. The capabilities of language communication have become intricately interwoven with a number of specific areas of the brain, and, we may safely consider this development of verbal communications to have been such a break-through, such an evolutionary advantage, that none of the proto-human branches which failed to develop speech, survived as contributors to the human gene-pool. In other words, the capability of speech became a crucial factor in the determination of human viability, and it became, therefore, incorporated into the genetic code.

The question arises, at what stage of development we should consider this rapidly evolving species to have become "human". Unfortunately, a specific answer to this question will always remain somewhat arbitrary. We have good reasons to believe, that many related species', in a rather wide spectrum of anthropoid life-forms, were on the same road towards evolving conceptual intelligence, but the competition for survival and a viable ecological niche was fierce, and, only one small segment survived and occupies this niche, now, as Homo Sapiens.

Symbolic representations, such as gesticular mimicry, and, later, abstract vocalisations or sound-symbols, served, increasingly, as a stimulus to re-activate a memory-trace. Through this process, man became aware of the fact, that he could recall an experience in an act of communication with his fellow human beings, and, he became also aware of the fact, that the other members of the group had very similar experiences or memory-traces.

Man had found an extra-ordinarily powerful method for enlarging the scope, and sharpening the focus, of the many experiences he was subjected to, and, he became aware, that he could trigger such a sensation of recall by a rather stylised gesture, or, even, a rather poor imitation, as soon as the practice of symbolic recall became common. The constant re-enforcement and sharpening of his memory-traces, the increasing clarity of his mental imagery, together with the ability to communicate specific awarenesses with the help of representative symbols, are, in essence, inseparable developments.

Man became increasingly aware of the possibility to experience the world around him, and, to some extent, the world within him, in a conscious, communicable manner. From this possibility, which was based upon the constant re-activation of his memory-traces, eventually, a greater awareness developed about the possibility, as well as the need, to classify and categorise these communicable awarenesses into a coherent framework of reference. Every time, man was able to classify a series of apparently unrelated events or appearances as variations from a common denominator, or, as events resulting from a similar cause-effect relationship, he reduced, dramatically, the need to manipulate many different language or communication symbols.

What was happening can be visualised as follows; from a stage of "physiological awareness", (which is a classification system carried-out by the brain on the basis of genetic instructions), man developed the ability to re-activate, voluntarily, without analogous stimuli, many experiences and memories. This process of re-activation was carried-out, initially, by crude gesticular communications. This, in turn, led to a rapid increase in the precision and number of mental images an individual could manipulate with the help of symbolic representations. Very soon, however, a limit would be reached in the number of separate events or circumstances an individual could handle and communicate symbolically, until man discovered a system of classifying all these symbolically represented awarenesses. This system turned-out to be a remarkable parallel to the physiological or biological classifications systems that were operating already in his brain. The discovery of the mental or psychological classification system occurred, of course, completely below the level of any conscious awareness about these mechanisms.

By discovering similarities in related symbolic representations of objects and events, man was able to classify the symbolic representations of these objects and events into categories of similarity. These objects and events were, then, ordened into a system with organising or classifying principles. These classifying principles, or common denominators, became, later, a conscious awareness on their own, and they took, then, their place as an "abstraction" in the repertoir of conscious awarenesses. Unknown to man, he duplicated, with a conscious and deliberate effort, a system of classification that was mirrored, very closely, by the subconscious or physiological classification mechanisms of the brain, which made the ability of recognition possible in the first place.

In every act of recognition, we are making use of our biologically inherited and genetically determined classification systems, because, as we have seen, the act of recognition would be impossible without a physiological classification system. The "conditioned reflex" is the basic biological unit of neurological function in our contemporary framework of explanatory cause and effect relationships. These, and other mechanisms, make it possible to classify awarenesses and anticipate happenings "physiologically". This mechanism of cerebral classification is shared by all the higher, behaviourally flexible animals.

In our conceptual classification systems, we employ essentially similar mechanisms, and, the physiological background is very similar indeed. However, the framework we use to classify and categorise mental images, is not a biologically given, neural structure or mechanism, but, it is, in essence, a conceptual framework, or, a structure of beliefs. In this way, we are able to relate awarenesses into a far larger framework than would be possible on the basis of a purely biological classification system. A conscious or verbalisable "comprehension" of our world of experiences becomes, now, possible with this conscious framework of relationships. These relationships emphasise, either, categories of similarity in existence, or, similarities in temporal relationships, which come to the fore with the help of chains of causes and their effects.

These mechanisms of consciously classifying our awarenesses and experiences provide the human being with an added dimension of mastery. This skill is manifested as a vastly increased comprehension of the contemporary sense impressions, as well as a useful mastery over the memory-traces that represent the experiences of the past.

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Chapter 6

Content

A review of conceptual developments.
Possibilities for experiencing a measure of individual variability in emotional significance.
The basis for reflective thought.
Discrepancies between the existential significance of the actual experience and the symbolically stimulated memory-recall.

Let us go back, once more, to this gigantic break-through, when man discovered, that he could re-activate a memory-trace by mimicry or imitative gesticulations. This sharpened and enlarged his awarenesses to an unprecedented level, but, we should keep in mind, that, a major part of man's world was comprised of the inter-actions of the individual with other members of the group. The members of a group re-lived, frequently, a stream of sense-impressions that included the relationships and events of social inter-actions, and, all these inter-actions, postures, gestures, vocalisations, etc., became part of the overall reality experience. However, in the act of mimicry, the recall of happenings and events brought to the fore, not only, the reality and attitudes of one person in relation to another, but, also, the events that were observed as they involved other people, or the animals of the plains.

A memory-trace could be stimulated into the focus of awareness by the reality of an event itself, or, it could be activated by the imitative gesturing or posturing of another individual. However, the associated feelings and emotions were, probably, less intense, when memory-recall occurred as a result of symbolic re-activation. While the discrepancy between the stimulus of an actual, analogous reality, and, the evoked memory-trace by mimicry, must have been felt, at least, intuitively, only later, must the awareness of this remarkable phenomenon have become sufficiently apparent to become abstracted as a conceptualised entity.

The very fact, that the symbolic recall of an event would have much less existential or emotional significance for the individual or the group, (compared to the actual reality of the event itself), became a foundation for the ability to differentiate a conscious awareness of these events from the experience of these events, as they were actually taking place. It seems safe to conclude, that the remarkable proliferation of concepts and ideas found its roots in the increased security, together with the tendency towards emotional moderation, whenever image-recall was evoked by symbolic means in the relative safety of the "home environment".

Just as a child is raptly listening to a fascinating story, hardly aware of the fact, that it is being moved by a captivating flow of words and gestures, so must early man have been unaware of what he was doing or what was happening, when he began to re-live experiences communally, with the recall of memories through the symbolic re-stimulation of his memory-traces. The ability to re-activate a large number of experiences at will, (in the safety of a communal shelter and away from the existential excitement of the actual experience), laid the foundation for reflective or retrospective re-evaluations, and, at the same time, the sharpened memory-traces could be classified with less anxiety and less emotional turmoil in the relative calm of a collective recall.

Certainly, this collective recall was, often, associated with strong emotional colorations, in particular, during the early development of symbolic representations, when there were virtually no secondary abstractions, and, the novelty of this stimulus would certainly evoke an instinctive behavioural response in the unsophisticated early human mind. The frequency of the act of recall, as well as the familiarity that arose with such frequently recalled experiences, tended to blunt the emotional response, and gave the individual a chance to reflect upon his experiences in an emotionally more controled manner.

It is hazardous to come to the conclusion, that we have laid the foundation for the phenomenon of reflective thought. However, we can be reasonably confident in the assumption, that the ability to re-activate a particular memory-trace with the help of a symbolic representation, represented indeed the fundamental development upon which our human ability to conceptualise has come to rest.

The memory-trace can be re-lived, time and again, and yet, the existential consequences are totally different and are far more secure compared to the experience of an analogous or actual event. We know that this is the case, because, in tense and precarious situations we do not revel in memories. We have our hands full dealing with the existential significance of the actual situation. This condition of "essential security" lies at the root of all art-appreciation, and, we may experience a highly beneficial and satisfying experience, whenever we let ourselves by guided by a gifted artist through a series of fascinating images, emotions, or feelings.

The fact, that we do not have to face the dangers and hardships of actually living through a fascinating series of events "in reality", gives us an opportunity to learn from other people's experiences. At the same time, the need for a "dramatic accent" in every art-form is a sure sign of our existential safety, as well as the emotional inertia that accompanies a position of existential security. In a way, this dramatic accent makes the artistic portrait, so often, a caricature of reality, in spite of the fact, that we reserve the word "caricature" for an exaggeration we are becoming aware of. Then, an artistic portrait becomes ridiculous, just because of its over-accentuation.

The feeling of existential security is heightened by the discrepancy between our situation as a spectator, and, the situation we could be in, as we identify with the main characters in an unfolding story. This discrepancy may become a powerful stimulus for an emotion of gratitude, but, it may also become the origin for an emotion of envy or dissatisfaction, whenever we are being lured into an irrealistic dream-world; whenever we are being exploited by clever, commercial interests to make us consume all sorts of tantalising sensations of power, pleasure or wealth.

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Chapter 7

Content

Self-stimulation of mental image-recall.
Later developments in the abstraction of a sense of individuality.
The existential significance of the process of reflection.

After having sketched, summarily, in the last few sentences, the link between the origin of art and symbolic representations, we may attempt a few thoughts about the origin of thought itself, especially, when seen in relation to the development of the art of symbolic representations. I suppose, that, even early man could "talk to himself", when he acted-out a mimicry or an imitation by himself, but, he probably did not do this in solitude, and, very likely, early man feared solitude, as his environment was far more dangerous and frightening than we can imagine it to be, from a contemporary position of existential security. It is, therefore, unlikely, that early man had a well-defined awareness of personal identity. The awareness of individual identity must have occurred at a much later stage in the cultural development of mankind, when individual differentiations became a prominent feature as a result of a greater ease of existence and an enhanced state of security.

Just as the animal will react as a unit, instinctively committed to self-preservation and the propagation of the species on account of the genetically encoded sexual drive, so did man act as a unit under the guidance of his genetically instructed behaviour-patterns. However, we can be reasonably sure, that, early man did not have a conscious awareness about this "unit of behaviour", and, he did not have a conscious awareness of his existence or identity, until he was able to form complex and sophisticated secondary abstractions, much later in the evolutionary development of the faculties of thought and reflection. Here again, we see an interesting parallel with the development of the young child. Young children learn to use language symbols quite early in life, and, they learn to use the symbol "I", long before they have the ability to reflect upon the nature or identity of this "I".

Reflecting upon internal mental awarenesses is a late stage in our personal development, and, it may well be, that such a reflection does not have a great deal of existential significance, except, perhaps, as a prodromal stage to a re-examination of the overall conceptual framework. Reflection is part of a process of re-thinking; of re-evaluating the truth of a communally accepted reality perception, and, it is, probably, only those vague feelings of unresolved tensions, discrepancies and conflicts, which induce man to question his basic assumptions and subconscious awarenesses.

We tend to focus upon this reflective process as an essential quality of being human, and, there is certainly good evidence to believe, that, no other animal has developed this power of reflection to any significant extent. At least, we have no evidence for this, so far. Yet, we should not forget, that we are looking at a late-comer in the chain of evolutionary developments. Reflective thought is a fragile and rare flower in the possibilities of organic existence, and, it certainly deserves a good deal of intellectual attention, but, we form a misleading image of our distant past, if we assume, tacitly, that man only became man, when he started to wonder and think.

We can find many examples, even, today, where people seem to be well-integrated into their social environment, and yet, they think or reflect very little about the fundamental questions of human existence, or, the nature of their own identity.

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Chapter 8

Content

The transition from a reaction to an awareness.
A review of human interpretations of animal awarenesses.
Neurological versus conceptual recognition patterns.
The origins of anthropomorphic interpretations of reality experiences.

Forgive me for coming back, once again, to the problem of animal awareness, but, it remains a problem for the powers of our imagination or conceptualisation, to trace a coherent imagery of the changes that took place, when comparing a behavioural response by a living organism with the conscious awareness of the stimuli and circumstances to which such an organism is reacting.

When we see an animal tense-up because of an impending danger and, then, take to the flight, acting and coordinating all its activities to the full, we feel perfectly justified to conclude, that this animal is aware of a serious threat to its existence. However, if we ask ourselves, what, exactly, this animal is aware of, (besides the physiological recognition of a threatening situation to which it reacted appropriately and according to its built-in genetic instructions and past experiences), we ask ourselves a truly difficult question.

When we describe an animal's reactions in behavioural terms, we construct a cause-effect framework of relationships that describes the totality of the behaviour of such an animal, and, we handle, indeed, the phenomena we observe with a remarkable degree of scientific confidence. If we try to analyse the mental processes that are going-on in such an animal, then, we come, instinctively, to the conclusion, that an animal must have similar mental or subjective experiences as we have, because its reaction-patterns are so similar to our own in a comparable situation. We conclude, nearly automatically and rather thoughtlessly, that the animal must be aware of a threat, danger, fear, as well as many other sensations, just like ourselves. However, to what extent are we justified to come to such a conclusion, in spite of the fact, that the animal is highly alert and obviously frightened?

To deny an awareness of danger seems ridiculous and contradicts, strongly, our observations, but, we tend to forget, that, in our attempts to analyse the awarenesses, or degrees of awareness, existing in a non-verbalising animal, we can only think, feel or analyse these appearances in terms of our own verbalisations, concepts and abstractions. We have to reflect in our imagery our particular range of capabilities and circumstances. In our interpretations, we imply, tacitly, that the animal can feel fear the way we feel fear, even, if we acknowledge that the animal can not put a label on this awareness.

Yet, it would, probably, be more accurate to say, that the animal undergoes strong, physiological reaction-patterns that organise its behaviour into a state of intense alertness and readiness to fight or flee, as the animal recognises the perception of the circumstances as "highly dangerous". Again, we have to emphasise, that this is a biological or neurological recognition, and not the recognition of a conceptualised framework of reality experiences.

It would be wrong to assume, that the animal is aware of the fact, that it recognises a dangerous situation. This process of verbalised recognition is our, specifically human interpretation of the mechanisms that go-on in the brain of an animal, (and, of ourselves), but, it is not so easy to recognise the differences with an animal's mechanisms of recognition, because we can not imagine, anymore, what it would be like, not to have the ability to verbalise and conceptualise.

We can only think and describe the realities of our environment, of our own behaviour and the animals around us, in conceptual terms. We have to be careful, therefore, to keep in mind our peculiarly human way of looking at reality, and, we have to remind ourselves, constantly, that, we, necessarily, describe any reality, or imagined reality, in conceptual and verbal symbols, indicating our peculiarly human methods of abstracting from, and focussing upon, our sense impressions.

We know, that a stimulus-response sequence becomes remarkably variable in the higher, behaviourally flexible animals, and, we know, that this response-pattern is modified by individualised past experiences and culturally transmitted behavioural guidelines. The state of alertness we see and sense in the animal, gives us such a strong feeling of recognition of a similar behaviour-pattern in ourselves, (as well as in other people), that we can not help but "project" our own awarenesses into the psychological range of experiences of the animal, and yet, we know, that this is incorrect.

We are not talking, here, about our own feelings of compassion and emotional identification with an animal in distress, when we say, that it is incorrect to project our own idea-world into the realm of animal psychological existence. The willingness to engage in an emotional identification with an animal in distress, as well as the recognition, that we share so many behavioural traits with the animals that are close to us in the evolutionary hierarchy, have become valuable tools in every attempt to understand our readiness and instinctive drive to give anthropomorphic features to the world of events around us.

An awareness in the human sense implies an ability to verbalise, at least, to some extent, a particular feeling or situation, while the awareness of the animal is a form of "alertness", together with the experience of behaviour-patterns that have been aroused by the organic or neurological recognition of an existentially significant situation. While the behaviour of an animal may resemble a human being, deliberating a difficult choice, the animal does not have the added struggle to choose certain concepts or structures of belief, and, it undergoes the struggle to make an appropriate response without knowing, why it struggles.

We have emphasised these differences between animal and human awareness, because an appreciation of these differences will help us to become aware of the biological foundation of our particular, and, perhaps, peculiar forms of human awareness. Once we understand the functions and limitations of our awareness mechanisms, we may be able to lose some of this instinctive drive to consider our beliefs to represent an absolute and unshakeable truth.

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Chapter 9

Content

Continuing developments in the mechanisms of verbalisation.
The communication of knowledge.
The description of an unknown specific in terms of generalised qualities.
The domestic dog and the interpretation of its behaviour.

Let us continue our efforts to trace the development of verbal symbols of our awarenesses, as well as the process of abstracting generalisations or common denominators from the various categories of sense impressions we may be aware of. However, we should also look, now, at the reverse process, where we build-up the image of an unknown item of existence by transferring a variety of generalised qualities to this specific item of the unknown. We have to do this, if we are unable to trigger a specific memory-trace in view of the fact, that our audience has never seen or experienced this particular specific before.

The process of the "secondary build-up" of a reality image has become such an integral part of our learning processes and communicating activities, that we are hardly aware of the peculiar characteristics associated with the transfer of knowledge and information. We have to transfer knowledge and information to our pupils or audience, often, without the benefit of a previous experience, or memory-trace, and, the absence of a previous experience excludes, of course, the possibility of an act of recognition.

Indeed, the unique characteristics of an unknown specific can only be conveyed to someone who has never experienced this specific item of awareness, by translating the unknown specific into a number of generally known qualities and attributes. Then, the recipient of a stream of information can, slowly, build-up the imagery of this specific by carefully following a description of it. If we would not be able to analyse a specific object or event into categories of generalised qualities and attributes, we would never be able to "learn" anything that is completely new, without having had a personal experience of a specific object or event. Without the build-up of an image with qualities and attributes, an unknown remains an unknown to which we would be unable to relate anything similar or familiar, until such time, that we have a direct, first-hand experience of this unknown event or item of existence.

Let us keep in mind, then, that our entire realm of awarenesses is linked together and criss-crossed by abstracted qualities, which make most of these awarenesses amenable to refinements in comprehension, as well as additional, specific and detailed descriptions, if such becomes necessary or desirable during an act of communication. Even the conveyance of a "picture", rather than a verbal description, is not sufficient to bridge the gap between the unknown and the familiar, because the picture of something that is unknown, still has to be described or analysed in terms and qualities that are "familiar", or known.

Most of us are, indeed, aware of vague and intuitive feelings, which we can not precisely describe in words. We feel greatly handicapped, if we try to communicate such feelings, and, we often hesitate to call this a form of awareness, because we are not sure, what we are aware of. An awareness, means, in general, a verbalisable and describable awareness, and, for this reason, we can safely say, that such an awareness does not exist for the non-verbalising animal.

"What about our domesticated dog, who listens attentively, when he hears his name, or, when he hears the words "walk" or "cookie"?", you will ask. "Is this not a form of symbolic representation? Is his attention not stimulated by associating an arbitrary, but symbolically meaningful sound with an evoked memory-trace?"

There can be no doubt, that the dog has learned to associate an arbitrary and intrinsically meaningless sound with a meaningful activity or event, but, we may explain such a "learning" as a conditioned reflex. Through the frequent association of the words "cookie" or "walk", with an edible object, or the pleasure of being taken outside for a walk, the arbitrary sound-symbol serves, now, as an appropriate stimulus to trigger the memory or image of this edible object or pleasant activity. It would be fair to say, that the dog is not "aware" of the fact, that this arbitrary word-symbol stimulates his memory in a certain manner. However, this brings us to the point, that, early man, during his first attempts to communicate, did not have any idea, either, about what he was doing. Early man was certainly not aware of having discovered a technique for symbolic representations. By accident, he had noticed, that he could re-live or re-call certain experiences with the help of gestures and mimicry.

Was man, then, any further than the dog is now? Yes, because early man stumbled on this possibility and recognised, at least, intuitively, the enormous existential advantage of such an activity, while the dog, regardless, how long he has been associated with his human master, has yet to exploit the possibility of symbolic representation for himself. By a prolonged association with his master, the dog certainly picks-up a large number of associations. He learns, through the mechanisms of a conditioned reflex, to associate certain human activities, gestures or sounds with something that is meaningful to him, but, we have, as yet, to see a dog communicate with another dog in the same manner; by the symbolic representation of certain awarenesses or activities.

"What about the specific posturing, or the "giving of a paw", as an indication that the dog wants something specific? Are these gestures not representative for something else? Does this not mean, that the dog may have some means of recalling a certain mental imagery, perhaps, under the influence of a desire, or a need to be let-out? Could he not be communicating such an imagery by giving a paw, or, by gesticulating or posturing towards other dogs or human beings?"

It is difficult to categorically deny, that this is, indeed, impossible, and, it would, in a sense, reflect our subconscious desire to look for exclusively human attributes, when we look for a definition or description of specifically human abilities, but, we have no evidence, that, any of these behavioural manifestations of animals are symbolically represented awarenesses that are being communicated, spontaneously, between the animals themselves.

Let us say, here, only, that the ability of symbolic representation and verbalisable conceptual thought, has been developed in the human species to such an extent, that we can not visualise, anymore, a form of awareness or thinking that does not have such a capability. Rather than denying the existence of such a capability in the non-human and non-verbalising animal, we would be on safer grounds to say, that the development of symbolically representable sense impressions is the primary reason for the break-through of the human species into an unparalleled range of ecological and behavioural possibilities, including the possibility to become a master over his surroundings, and, even, a master over the world of his own contradictory instincts. Yet, the "anlage" for such an ability of symbolic represention may have its roots far earlier than the specific development of the human species, because this concept of an early anlage reflects, after all, a generally valid phenomenon and mechanism of evolution and natural selection.

To come back on the "posturing" of a dog. It is not too difficult to explain this form of behaviour as essentially different from symbolic representation. Posturing is a partial expression of an instinctively engraved pattern of behaviour, perhaps, of territorial defense. However, it may also represent the partial expression of many different behaviour-patterns, because the posturing develops, gradually, into a fully unfolded behaviour-pattern as the intensity of the challenge increases.

The expression of a "begging" posture is a non-specific attention-seeking device, whereby the dog makes, subconsciously, use of a posture that is essentially meaningless to him. However, this behaviour-pattern has been stimulated into a measure of significance by his human master, since the dog has learned that this intrinsically meaningless gesture may lead to a beneficial result. The dog does not know, why he should give a paw, but experience has taught him, that, giving a paw led, frequently, to a beneficial result. The dog gives a paw in the expectation that some sort of a desired result will soon follow.

We can not over-emphasise the significance of the discovery of symbolic representations by early man. Man could, now, recall and re-live, more or less at will, an experience that was shared with several or most members of the group. The communal experience of a simultaneously re-lived experience, divorced from the extreme existential significance in terms of danger or excitement associated with a "real event", must be the basis for our ability to be consciously aware of a specific event or circumstance, and, it must have become the foundation for the usefulness of observations made in a zone of emotional near-neutrality.

The frequent, perhaps, nearly constant recalling of routine, daily experiences, led to a slow systematisation of the symbols in use, and, eventually, a simple and stylised gesture, a sign or a sound, would serve as an adequate stimulus for an evoked memory-trace, or a mental picture that was understood, by everyone, in essentially the same manner.

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Chapter 10

Content

Symbolic representations and cultural developments.
Parallels between neurological and conceptual classification systems.
Mobility and perception in animal organisms.
The relative rigidity of recognition patterns.

We should have a look at this interesting human ability to ask questions. We have discussed, how the ability to communicate with symbolic representations led, quickly, to the need to orden these symbols into some kind of a manageable framework of structural relationships, because the number of separate symbols we can handle and communicate without the help of logical deductions and intuitive associations, is limited, indeed. We have also discussed the interesting parallels between the organic or neurological organisation of sense impressions, on the one hand, and, the classification of verbalisable concepts and ideas, on the other. We have seen, that the development of concept formation is a specifically human sub-specialisation of the broad, evolutionary trend of behavioural flexibility.

The main feature of behavioural flexibility is a loosening of the stimulus-response arc, which leads in the human species to the inter-position of a conscious reality perception between a stimulus and its appropriate response. The neurological equivalent of these psychological functions is represented by a large number of nerve-cells situated in between the incoming sense impressions and the out-going behavioural responses. Its psychological equivalent, the structure of conscious reality perceptions or beliefs, guides, to a large extent, our behaviour, in particular, when we have to make conscious decisions in order to arrive at an appropriate behavioural response.

If we are not sure about our decisions, we may feel a need to receive additional information, or, we need someone else's input into our evaluative and decision-making processes. We are all subjected to this constant, primarily subconscious process of gathering more information before coming to a decision. The more conflicting the incoming sense impressions are, the more difficult will be the behavioural choice, and, we will have to make a greater effort to come to a satisfactory decision.

Most of the questions we ask are routine, but, we reserve the concept of "asking questions" to those incidences, where we do this deliberately. Most of the subconscious information-gathering processes are so automatic, that we do not perceive these activities to be analogous to the mechanism of "asking a question". Our conscious questions are, primarily, designed to help us understand our environment, and to orient ourselves in relation to this environment. All the questions we ask, deliberately, fall into this category, because we want to clarify our understanding in order to come to a better response.

Yet, ironically, many of the most "fundamental" questions are not perceived in this light. It seems, indeed, somewhat strange to consider our questions about the nature of God, the Universe, or man himself, as designed to make us behave "more appropriately", but, if we think about it, we realise, that a better behavioural response is, indeed, the objective of these fundamental considerations or questions. We have seen, that our sense of awe and wonderment, as well as our curiosity and drive to explore, to think and ponder, go back, in essence, to our desire to behave or exist more harmoniously with ourselves and our environment.

We would underestimate the overall meaning of the feature of behavioural flexibility, if we would fail to appreciate the fact, that the first natural experiments with behavioural flexibility or plasticity, occurred a long time ago; when the animal life-form began to develop more complex sensing organs in order to help it shape a more appropriate motoric response to the stimuli it was receiving from its environment. When reviewing the animal organism, we see, that the first evidence for flexibility in behavioural expression is, indeed, in the field of movement. The essential feature of an animal organism is the capability to move in search of the most favourable circumstances for survival, and, this means, a response or movement towards a source of food, or a mate, and a move away from dangerous stimuli or noxious influences.

In the free-floating, single cell, we see the first signs of the protoplasmic capability of "movement", or "flow", and, the stimuli that induce "protoplasmic movements" are represented by a variety of chemical substances and concentration-gradients in the neighbourhood of the cell. These mechanisms are reflected in the concepts of "chemo-taxis", or, chemically induced movements or protoplasmic flow, but, the highly developed, multi-cellular organisms have developed a variety of special sense-organs, enabling them to perceive, in various ways, and, often, at a considerable distance, those targets or sources of stimuli that are meaningful to them; either in a positive or a negative sense; a target to be approached, or, to be avoided.

Most complex animals show a remarkable behavioural flexibility, or adaptative learning ability, as we see in the variety of pathways these animals can take to reach or avoid a specific target, but, the range of recognition-patterns for such targets remains much more limited. The surroundings are "perceived" in terms of a nearly constant search for food, shelter or a mate, as well as the reactions that are necessary to avoid a predator. The motoric adaptations are quite varied or flexible, while the range of perceptions seems to be more static and remains narrowly focussed. A duck will be able to search a pathway to or from the water in numerous and highly varied ways, but the range of perceptions that will alter the animal's behaviour, is quite limited indeed.

It may well be, however, that we have become so used to think about the range of perceptions in terms of generalised abstractions, or "instincts", that we tend to emphasise the existential meaning of behaviour in static concepts. These static concepts have a tendency to overlook a much wider variety of actual perceptions lying behind the many different behavioural responses.

Yet, I believe that it is still accurate to say, that the perception patterns in animals are more static and standardised compared to the motoric behaviour-patterns, which show, indeed, an astonishing variety of detailed mechanisms, in particular, when we take the complicated proprio-ceptive feed-back mechanisms into consideration that arise from the muscles and tendons of an animal organism.

Even under natural circumstances, all animals "run a maze", by learning, where to turn for an obstacle, or, where to make use of a pre-existing pathway to reach their goals. These animal organisms are driven by their biological instincts and motivations, which have been triggered into action when a set of stimuli was within a limited but recognisable range. Many metabolic activities of the organism are responsible for a remarkable sensitising influence upon these primary biological instincts or drives, which we conceptualise as hunger, thirst, the sexual drive, or the instincts of aggressive and defensive behaviour-patterns.

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Chapter 11

Content

Biological needs and animal perceptions.
Questions of viability and variability.
The optimum range of flexibility in patterns of recognition and adaptation.
The enlargement of the range of perceptions.
The variable balance between positive and negative stimuli.
Limitations of the genetic code.
Culture, seen as a broadened concept of non-genetically transferred codes of behaviour.

We have come back to the conclusion, that the perceptual capabilities of an animal are totally in the service of its existential requirements. The focus and range of an animal's sense-organs reflect the utilitarian aspects of its awarenesses, and, we have seen, how an animal tends to fall asleep, whenever the intensity of significant perceptions attenuates during a state of near-optimum homeostasis. The arousal mechanisms are sensitised or activated, whenever the metabolic activities have depeleted, to some extent, the reserves of the organism, and stimuli, which were neglected before, become meaningful, once again.

The recognition of a meaningful sense impression serves as a focal point for the organisation of a behavioural response, and, we have discussed on previous occasions, how we can divide, functionally, the organisation of the central nervous system into two broad categories; on the one hand, there is a complex information-gathering and processing section, and, on the other, we see a remarkably complex "neurological computer", which is responsible for organising smooth and well-adapted motoric responses. These areas are spatially somewhat separated, but they are, nevertheless, intertwined.

A wrong behavioural response could be fatal, and would, then, be unable tot serve as a basis for modifying a subsequent response in a similar situation. A mistake or a negative result from a particular response, must undermine, physiologically or neurologically, the degree of reliance an animal is willing to place on a particular perception or response, because the conditioned reflex-arc between perception and response has been weakened. If a stimulus has led an animal several times to a futile hunt, or an unnecessary flight, it will have wasted a large amount of energy, and, it will, therefore, be less viable than the other members of the species who did not react at all to a "false alarm".

It is clear, that an animal has to rely, without any doubts or hesitation, on the accuracy of its sense impressions, and, it becomes understandable, that the inter-position of a belief structure in the members of mankind may introduce a significant liability, or, even, a fatal flaw, if it interferes with a physiological advantage. We pay for this extra flexibility in the structuring and interpretation of our sense impressions and the potential of achieving unparalleled mastery. We pay for it, by losing the rigidity of a physiologically determined perception of our realities. However, we are focussing our attention, here, on the physiologial flexibility of perceptions and behaviour-patterns in non-verbalising animals, rather than human beings.

The ability to change the source of food, (depending upon ecological, climatological or seasonal circumstances), is, obviously, a great advantage for the ability to survive, but, the necessary widening of the range of sense impressions, making it possible to obtain this flexibility in finding many different kinds of food, also implies, that the range of potentially dangerous circumstances, as well as anxiety-provoking perceptions, has increased dramatically.

Therefore, a widening of the range of perceptions that can trigger a food-searching behaviour, has to be coupled with an increase in the range of perceptions that may spell danger, and could, or would, act as a damper upon the impulse to pursue a particular prey or object. Increased flexibility is, therefore, a complex balancing act between an increased range of positive and negative perceptions and experiences. This results in a remarkable increase in the flow of contradictory information and calls for innovative behavioural responses. It calls for a "fine-tuning" in behaviour, because the primary forms of instinctive behaviour, (which are organically inherited response-patterns), are quickly becoming too crude to yield satisfactory results under these complex environmental circumstances.

We have attempted, here, to sketch, briefly, the origins of intelligent or finely-tuned behaviour. Intelligent behaviour develops in response to the need to maintain viability, whenever the range of perceptions and responses increases dramatically as a result of an evolutionary trend towards a more flexible pattern of behavioural responses by the members of a particular species. This remarkable increase in the range of perceptions and responses, means, that, quickly, the genetic code is unable to provide specific behavioural instructions for all the possibilities and opportunities that may be encountered, and, increasingly, the criteria of viability begin to rely upon the modification of individual behaviour-patterns in accordance with past experiences.

The build-up of a repertoir of personal experiences is, however, often, a painful and costly method to acquire a more finely tuned behavioural response-pattern, because a major mistake may easily become fatal. A more efficient way of learning is provided by a generalised imitation or take-over of viable behaviour-patterns from the adult or parental generations. This method for acquiring specific behaviour-patterns from the parental generations narrows the range of personal experimentation and reduces the chances for fatalities amongst the vulnerable youngsters. Yet, the older generation is relatively free to experiment with new forms of behaviour, which may provide an extra measure of viability, and, every successful adaptation will, again, be followed, rather blindly, by the younger generations.

We should not visualise these processes of collective and individual experimentation with novel behaviour-patterns to operate under sharply different circumstances. Rather, the ability, or opportunity, to make small changes in behaviour, based on personal experience, takes place within the specific limits or tolerances set by the behaviour-patterns of the adults within the social environment. In turn, adult behaviour has been shaped, primarily, by imitating the leadership of the older generations.

We are talking, here, about "acquired" behaviour-patterns. These have been transmitted from one generation to the next by example and imitation, and, we have, here, the beginning of this entire complex of non-genetic behavioural transfer, which is so flexible, just because it has not been locked into the rigidity of a genetic code.

I believe, that it is justified to define this development as the essence of a "cultural guideline". By including all non-genetically transmitted forms of behaviour as essentially "cultural" in nature, we loosen this concept from a specific human quality, and, at the same time, we do not limit the concept of "culture" to the transmission of verbalisable concepts, or human artifacts, which can be learned by the transfer of a symbolic imagery.

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Chapter 12

Content

The inter-play between the perception of reality and the quality of behavioural responses.
Feed-back mechanisms.
Chance or inevitability in the evolutionary development of the possibilities for symbolic representation?

Let us consider, for a moment, the inter-play between the quality of a behavioural response and the perception, or sense impression, that triggered this response. We may have given the impression, that the remarkable flexibility and complexity of the behavioural response had little or no bearing on the rather static quality of the significant sense impressions themselves. This, however, would be inaccurate, because it is obvious, that a highly successful response to an existentially significant situation, (e.g., the response to a specific threat or danger), will make the animal more confident, and the ease with which it responded to such a danger or apparent danger, makes the significance of the sense impression somewhat less dramatic, whenever a similar situation arises in the near future.

Similarly, a positive perception that leads, relatively easily, to the desired result, will gain in significance, because the importance of such a perception increases, since the animal recognises or knows, now, a relatively easy way to secure its viability; e.g., food or shelter. There is, therefore, a shift possible in the meaning or significance attached to a specific sense impression, depending upon the nature of the behavioural response and its results. This is, of course, a good example of a "feed-back" mechanism.

Let us now consider the question, whether or not the possibility to represent sense impressions symbolically, (obviously an important mile-stone on the road towards human evolution), was a chance discovery, which proto-man, as the ancestor of the human species, stumbled upon by accident. Or, did the process of symbolic representations develop as a necessity, which had to be explored, and, was bound to be found, in view of the line of development evolution had taken in its experiment with behavioural flexibility?

Like we have seen so many times before, the answer depends upon our point of view. It may be worthwhile to recapitulate, first, a generalised imagery about animal life, which has a bearing on the answer to this question. All animal life exhibits a measure of freedom in its behavioural responses. There is a certain degree of "searching" for the most appropriate response, even, if this freedom to search is confined within a narrow range of tolerances. This "searching behaviour" is, especially, apparent in the movements of an animal, and the search for the best possible movements implies the existence of a feed-back mechanism, where the animal is able to evaluate, continuously, the effects of a particular movement or response.

If all animal life-forms exhibit this "searching behaviour" within the limits set by their organic structure, we certainly may expect those life-forms with a much larger range of individual behavioural variability, to show such characteristics very prominently. There can be no doubt, that such a searching behaviour for the optimal response was, and still is, a dominant characteristic of the human and pre-human organisms, and, the necessary feed-back mechanisms that allow the animal organism to monitor, from moment to moment, the success or significance of a certain response, are an essential and integral part of such a behavioural complex.

Seen in this light, it becomes clear, that all behavioural opportunities are explored, continuously, within the range of physiologically given possibilities, and, it seems, therefore, inevitable, that the pre-human life-form would start to experiment with mimicry and the imitation of sense impressions; a process, we conceptualise, now, to be the fore-runner of the art of symbolic representation. On the other hand, we may also view such a development as a random process of exploring potentials and possibilities, and, only, when the feed-back mechanisms of a group of organisms, living together, discern, clearly, an existential advantage in such an activity, only then, will such behaviour be explored further.

As we have seen, the "accidental" discovery of the technique of symbolic representation constituted such an enormous advantage, that viability became, eventually, closely linked with this ability. Of course, the animals experimenting with symbolic representation had no idea of the significance of what they were doing. There was, as yet, no concept of the process of symbolic representation itself. There was only the empirical awareness, that such communal activities allowed the group to sharpen the memory of their experiences, and, these activities constituted, therefore, a remarkable advantage in their continuous struggle for survival.

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Chapter 13

Content

Neurological capabilities of classification as a pre-requisite for the function of recognition.
The function of anticipation in the classification of events.
The abstraction of qualities, secondary abstractions and generalisations.

The mechanism of "cerebral classification" indicates the existence of a physiological or neurological capability of the brain to classify a whole range of similar perceptions into a class of similarities. This class will have its own common denominator; otherwise, even the simple recognition of a sensory awareness as something that has been seen or experienced before, would not be possible. If the range of variability within such a class would be extra-ordinarily narrow, the frequency of recognition would drop disastrously, and the animal would not find the occasional recognition of a specific sense impression very useful. On the other hand, if the range would be too wide, the sharpness or consistency of the significance of such a category would disappear, and, consequently, the results from the behavioural response would be confused and contradictory.

The same applies to the cerebral classification of events, because the brain, (seen, here, with the concepts of the conditioned reflex), would be able to anticipate the sequence of an event by recognising the class of events it belongs to. Therefore, a recognised event would evoke, automatically, the anticipation of the next phase of the event, as a result of the fact of having experienced the association of one event with another. This association has been experienced often enough to have been recorded as a valid anticipation.

Events are also classified into categories, just as all other sense impressions, and the same limitations of too narrow or too wide a range of variability determine the usefulness of a category of memory-traces of past events, or experiences, as a tool for making decisions or formulating expectations.

The brain has shown us, (in our contemporary interpretation of cerebral function), a mirror-image of the processes that take place within our conceptual awareness systems. In addition to classifying, cerebrally, sense impressions into categories with a recognisable common feature, we have learned, by necessity, to classify a whole range of symbolically representable images into a mentally coherent framework of related categories.

While each symbolic representation is already a class on its own by virtue of the fact that it represents a recognisable item, we super-impose upon our physiological or cerebral classification systems, a variety of psychological classification systems, where the classifying mechanisms are verbalisable and have been deliberately built into a structure of generalising and ordening abstractions.

These "structural concepts" become the regulators or classifying principles of the primary concepts, and, they are, therefore, "secondary abstractions". If, for example, we have learned to call a whole group of commonly used objects a class of "cooking utensils", or, just, "utensils", we group-together a large series of individually recognised and separately represented symbols into a new entity on account of a common denominator; e.g., their use in cooking. In doing so, we form a new awareness; nl., that of "cooking utensils", which now ties together, in the form of a secondary abstraction, a whole field of previously separate awarenesses. However, each individual awareness already represents a primary abstraction, because we are always dealing with a class of similar objects.

This process is repeated time and again, and, it has given us many layers of awarenesses, mostly as varying levels of abstraction or generalisation. In this way, we can orden an extra-ordinarily large number of separate awarenesses into a more or less coherent framework of comprehension.

The fact, that our conceptual structures require modification, at least, from time to time, is well known, and, on occasion, we feel the need to re-think, from the ground up, our classification systems, because we are beginning to encounter increasing difficulties fitting newly discovered awarenesses into a well-established scheme of conceptual inter-relationships. The discovery that we can categorise most, if not all, of our conscious awarenesses into coherent structures of conceptual relationships, is the most powerful tool of the human being in his continuing search to master the environment and secure his survival.

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Chapter 14

Content

Technological innovations and the possibilities for dense population concentrations.
The independent existence of abstract qualities in our mental imagery.
A shift in the process of learning towards the secondary transfer of mental images.
The expectation to receive answers.
A review of the classification of knowledge and information.
Relationships with reliance and truth.

When we are thinking about the technological break-throughs of man, we are not talking about the recent complications that have arisen from the explosion of our technical mastery. Throughout the period of man's recorded history, we can see, how the use of tools and weapons, as well as the art of making shelters or domesticate animals and cultivate plants, provided, increasingly, a marked advantage in man's ability to survive, in spite of the fact, that man's increasing hostilities towards each other has made human history a ceaseless round of wars and upheavals.

These early technological break-throughs were brought-about by the need for people to live ever closer together, and, their success provided the possibility for viable population concentrations. The societies of mankind were becoming much larger and more complex than the nomadic groups of early mankind. Undoubtedly, these developments reflected the fact, that the "easy" areas to live in were becoming more difficult to find, as the human species became rapidly more numerous. It is fair to say, that the cultural and technological break-throughs that resulted from these increasingly large social entities, have made man what he is today.

Let us, therefore, speculate about the broadening horizon of man's awarenesses, which took place under the influence of increased contacts. Let us speculate about these fundamental developments, which made the larger societies possible and viable. We will not discuss the traditional factors of communications and record-keeping, which are the usual focus for observations about early human history. Here, we are concerned with the need for an increased sophistication in the mechanisms of classifying sense impressions and verbalisable concepts. It is certain, that man's immediate environment became much more complex, and, this development required a much greater dexterity in handling mental abstractions.

The first level of sophistication would be the awareness, that the impressions or perceptions of certain objects, events or circumstances, could be identified by certain characteristics or qualities, and, many objects or events could have certain qualities in common over and beyond those, that led to the existing classification. These qualities acquire, then, a separate identity and existence with their own symbolic representation.

Before they become verbalisable concepts, these common features existed as a tacit agreement, or, as commonly shared but vaguely delineated notions. We experience all the time, how the need to classify leads to abstractions and generalisations. Aspects and qualities are, in essence concepts, or abstractions, of common denominators, until they start to form a class with common features themselves, leading, eventually, to further abstractions and generalisations. It is important to realise, that these abstractions exist, then, as a separate conceptual entity, but, they are not observable as separate, tangible entities for our senses, because they are fused with the many specific, observable ojects and events we are continuously in contact with.

After we learned to analyse the tangible world around us in terms of qualities, attributes and other abstractions, we also learned, slowly, to represent, symbolically, the commonly shared experiences related to feelings, attitudes, fears, hopes, etc. Eventually, we became aware of the process of symbolic representation and abstraction itself, and, we learned to grasp these mechanisms in concepts of cause and effect, or, categories of similarities and analogies. It is not surprising, then, that the perceptive human being would, occasionally, feel a sense of wonder and awe, as he realised, vaguely, the endless diversity and quantity of actual and potential awarenesses.

Our virtuosity in classifying sense impressions, as well as the steady rise of the number and level of abstractions, increased our confidence and expectations to the point of assuming, automatically, that any discrepancies or gaps we became aware of, could be answered by the social environment. This assumption was re-enforced continuously, while learning and manipulating the complex schemes of mental relationships. As youngsters, we experienced the fact, that these gaps in understanding could be clarified by asking questions from the people around us, in particular, from our parents, or, the leaders of the social environment. Not only, did we come to expect a definite label, or name, for anything we did not know, but, we began to ask for an analysis of the object or event which had caught our attention. We asked for an analysis in terms of commonly known qualities and attributes we had become familiar with already.

Gradually, an enormously important shift in emphasis occurred in our learning processes. By growing-up in an environment where every new awareness was immediately labeled by our parents and teachers, we grew-up in the expectation to "learn" an unknown item or event in terms of a constellation of qualities and abstractions that would describe such an unknown item or event, rather accurately. In this way, we learned to form a reasonably accurate image of something we had never experienced before. This is the mechanism of the secondary transfer of knowledge, but, before this became a major form of learning, every event or item of existence we experienced had already been named for us by our social environment, and we could master the occurrence of such an event or experience by calling it by its name.

Because we all grow-up in a social environment, the correlation of everything we learn is grasped in a communal structure of beliefs that describes the world around us. This structure of beliefs is, most often, a religious explanation of existence and essence, and, all our experiences become, then, classified within such an overall view of the world, which we experience to exist around and within us.

During our formative years, we learn, not only, the cultural vocabulary of the names or symbolic representations of all the awarenesses we are likely to encounter, but, we learn, at the same time, the systems of classification and cause-effect relationships that are current in our society. Our personal experiences become less important, because so many of our own experiences become classified into a culturally transmitted conceptual structure of perceptions and explanations, and, only later, some of us will be sensitive and persistent enough to realise the existence of major flaws in the reality perceptions we took-over from our cultural environment.

Most of us grapple with the complexities and contradictions of our cultural heritage for the rest of our lives, but, we rarely become precisely aware of the reasons, why, and in what aspects, our cultural heritage is confusing and contradictory. We see, then, that the sheer size and complexity of the cultural heritage of a social enviroment, with its numerous verbalisable and "learnable" concepts and symbols, becomes a good reason for specialising in knowledge and function, as well as accepting a status of mutual interdependence.

The intellectual specialist earns his living, and dominates in his social surroundings, by virtue of his dexterity in manipulating learned symbols, together with the application of these skills within a narrow range of reality perceptions. A smoothly functioning ability to classify new experiences into a pre-existing framework of relationships, as well as the resulting ease with which a new situation is "grasped", are highly valued and potentially useful capabilities in a complex and confusing social conglomerate, depending upon the orientation of the motivation. This "easiness of grasp" gives us a feeling of confidence in such a mental framework, and, we are then experiencing a clear-cut, verbalisable scheme of relationships that determines the classification and regulates the flow of all other, more transient awarenesses. Now, we have a "belief structure", and the degree of reliance an individual or group places in this structure of beliefs, accounts for the degree of reality feeling, or "truth", that is associated with these structural concepts.

Truth is, therefore, a reflection of the level of trust we place in certain explanatory or regulatory concepts, and, the more unquestioned our reliance is, the more we feel these concepts to be the truth "as it really exists". This reliance upon a set of mental concepts may become existentially extra-ordinarily significant. Often, we stake our lives on the absolute validity of a particular perception of a reality, and, we can, therefore, expect a very strong emotional reaction, when these reality perceptions or belief structures are questioned or challenged. Security has been based on the truthfulness of such belief structures, and, we should not be surprised to encounter a hostile reception, whenever we dare to question the validity of rigidly held beliefs.

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Chapter 15

Content

A comparison of religious and scientific beliefs.
The basic scientific assumption; the essential predictability of all events.
The logic of an anthropomorphic interpretation of reality.

If we try to define the essential difference between a scientific and a religious belief structure, it becomes apparent, that, in modern scientific thought, we have come to a basic, if tacit assumption. This is the conclusion, that the entire observable realm of nature, including man, can be grasped in terms of "natural laws". These laws describe regularly recurring or persistent force-fields, which are essentially different from the inconsistent and, often, arbitrary patterns of a willed or voluntary act. Scientific thought has even a strong tendency to deny the existence of such "freely willed" behaviour in man himself, while the essence of every religious interpretation of reality, is the acceptance of a voluntary, anthropomorphic act of "willed creation", fitting-in, somewhere, in the overall explanatory systems of causes and their effects.

A large number of specifically willed actions of a large group of human beings, may, indeed, at times, be subject to a correct statistical analysis and prediction, but, this is only possible because of the random distribution of a large number of "voluntary specifics" with a tendency to cancel each other. Statistical predictability of a large population of phenomena does not make any judgements about the internal cause-effect relationships of the many sub-events, nor, does it distinguish between predictable forces and arbitrary choices as the basis for the overall happenings, because statistical correlation and predictability depend, in essence, on the presence of a recognised pattern of recurrence.

However, this is an aside, and, we would like to emphasise, here, the implicit assumption of all scientific thought and classification systems, nl., that we are not dealing in the observable realm of phenomena with willed, anthropomorphic force-fields, but only, with a flow of forces and their resulting phenomena, which are intrinsically capable of being grasped by intellectual generalisations.

For early man, and for mankind throughout the greatest part of its history, such a scientific point of view would, not only, be unthinkable, but, it would contradict, directly, the evidence from man's own primary sense impressions. In fact, all animal force-fields, including man's own, are characterised by the ability to excercise a deliberate and voluntary will, with an arbitrary choice and purpose in the formation of their goal-patterns. We can generalise these phenomena and grasp them, now, to some extent, with our concepts of "biological needs" or "existential concerns".

To see in the large world of natural events an extra-polation of these arbitrary and "willed" force-fields, was a perfectly logical conclusion for early man, and, the scientific re-interpretation of the natural force-fields in the light of non-willed, a-personal and essentially predictable events, constitutes, indeed, a remarkable change in attitude, as well as a powerful break-through in man's grasp over natural events.

However, the idea of a created, original source for all existence, including the existence of all matter-energy, remains an almost inescapable conclusion for most human minds, especially, because it remains so difficult to visualise the concept of "eternity". The important question, here, for our attitudes towards a super-natural or creative force, is the concept, that such a super-natural, creative deity may be approached by man, either collectively or individually; in an attempt to change the circumstances to the benefit of those who pray to God.

This is the crucial difference between the religious and the scientific attitude or approach to the interpretation of our realities. All our ideas pivot on this point of view, whenever we try to grasp man's nature and destiny, the meaning of suffering, as well as the possibility of ever-lasting life. We will not review, here, the various images that are related to the religious and scientific points of view, but, we want to emphasise, once again, the consequences that flow from a choice between these two great systems of thought and explanation.

We have discussed the view, that the formation of a belief structure, regardless of its contents, emerges as a biological necessity for the human being, and, we have seen, that this phenomenon should be considered, together with the entire sphere of primary awarenesses and conceptual abstractions, as a behavioural or biological tool. Indeed, the tool of "conscious awareness" is entirely in the service of collective or individual viability. We have come to these conclusions, now, several times, from different lines of thought.

Let us, therefore, review the scientific and religious view-points and attitudes from the common ground that is shared by both; from the common functions of the living human being in terms of existential requirements and behavioural objectives. On many occasions, we have discussed the remarkable technological success and mastery that resulted from insights and belief structures, based on careful observations and made in an emotionally neutral frame of mind. These observations tend to give us a coherent and persuasive imagery of a non-anthropocentric and non-egocentric vantage-point, where the persuasiveness of the scientific interpretation is, ideally, based on logical extra-polations, experiments and reasoned arguments. This imagery tends to leave us somewhat in the dark, however, about our questions of ultimate concern, and, it provides very little sustenance for this remarkable stress-adaptation, called "hope".

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Chapter 16

Content

The function of the attitude of hope.
Hope and stress.
An analysis of stress.
Communal effects of acute and chronic stress.
Guilt and gratitude.
The functions and limitations of emotional neutrality.
Hope and atonement.
Destructive aspects of too great a stress-resistance because of religious beliefs and hopeful expectations.
The usefulness of emotional neutrality in the prevention of stressful situations.
A review of our need for certainty.
The mobilisation of motivational energies.
Some loss of resistance in coping with stress represents a fair price to pay for an increased range of understanding and emotional control.
The emotionally neutral hope.

In conclusion, let us take one more look at the attitude and outlook we call "hope". If, for one reason or another, the pressures upon our existence increase, we call the resulting phenomena "stress", regardless, whether these phenomena are observed in another living organism or experienced, subjectively, by ourselves. The concept of stress indicates the overall resistance an organism will show, physically as well as mentally, whenever it is driven-away by stressful pressures from a comfortable and optimum equilibrium. Such pressures may result from environmental changes, or, very commonly, from competitive pressures by other organisms, or, the stress may result from the disruptive pressures of sickness, injuries or old-age.

The human being exhibits, just like all other life-forms, a certain "elasticity" during its existence. We resist, partially, and we give-way, partially, but, living under such conditions, away from a comfortable equilibrium, gives us a feeling of stress or tension, because there is a constant force-field within us, biologically and psychologically, which wants to restore the original point of equilibrium.

If the pressures increase, we yield more, and, we resist more, but, we are quickly reaching a limit of our ability to withstand the stress associated with either process. As we yield more, our internal resistance mounts, and, if we resist the external pressures more, an ever greater effort is needed to prevent a sudden collapse of our stress-resisting capabilities and a catastrophic disruption of our physical and mental cohesion. Both mechanisms are called "stress", and both processes occur simultaneously.

If we consider the psychological equivalents of these displacement forces, we see, that these pressures, together with our efforts to resist them, arouse powerful emotions and anxieties. We come to the conclusion, largely intuitively, that these pressures may become highly dangerous for our well-being, and, we experience an acute discomfort, while trying to resist the displacement forces that drive us away from a comfortable status-quo. We notice, again mostly intuitively, that our behaviour is emotional, and, we have to make a deliberate effort to think rationally and calmly. Yet, we know, that we have to control our emotional impulses, if we want to find the most beneficial solution to our problems.

We are defensive, in the sense, that we try to struggle with the forces that drive us away from an optimum equilibrium, and, at the same time, we are aware, that the remainder of our elan vital is trying to restore our previous equilibrium. This is, in a way, an active or aggressive form of behaviour, where we try to "push back" those forces that are infringing upon our domain, our territory, or our rights. These are, in essence, "reactionary" behaviour-patterns.

Most of us will find ourselves, from time to time, involved in such a struggle, because none of us can exist without experiencing a measure of challenge or competition from our environment, and, we have discussed the reasons, why we need a moderate dose of challenge and stimulation in order to remain active, alert and agile. We actually enjoy a challenge, and the boundary-line between a joyful challenge and a painful stress is vague and variable, depending, largely, on our attitudes and stress-resisting abilities.

The severity of a displacement force varies markedly and ranges from a mild stimulation of our attitudes of concern, to life-threatening conditions. We may see people cling desperately to life, barely surviving under extremely harsh conditions, or, we may see a revolting and absurd pre-occupation with trivia or unproductive and destructive activities, if a bored and confused generation of affluent consumers is searching for a sense of meaning in their existence, as well as an outlet for their energies.

When individual people, or, even, entire communities, experience the life-threatening upheavals of wars or famines, a comfortable level of existence has been completely destroyed. The levels of stress and anxiety are severe, while the need for mutual assistance and cooperation increases sharply. The emotional satisfactions that may come from a successful increase in mutual assistance, can be enormous, and may replace the sense of stress with a feeling of gratitude, or, even, security, which was unknown in a more pleasant and less stressful condition of existence. The need for such comforting emotions, attitudes and insights is so strong, and the influence of these emotions is so powerful, that we see, often, a measure of resilience in people under stress which is totally amazing and hard to comprehend, even for those, who are experiencing these emotions themselves.

There can be no doubt, that the psychological mechanisms of collective resilience are very important in resisting stress, and, they may prove to be crucial for the ability to survive a communal disaster. The strength and joy of extensive contacts is unparalleled and will be treasured as a valuable experience. The attitudes of communal cooperation and the stream-lining of the will to survive lay the foundation for a cultural code of great strength and beauty, which may survive for a number of generations.

We have sketched, here, the circumstances that emphasise the nature and function of the attitude of "hope". In an emotionally neutral evaluation, we can analyse, quite accurately and objectively, the factors that will influence the immediate future, but, in severe, stressful situations, this analysis results, nearly always, in a feeling of despair, because we can not see any logical reason to expect an improvement, whenever we look at the situation with detached objectivity. Under these circumstances, emotional neutrality and objective analysis would interfere with our somewhat blind desire to "hope for the best", and, it would put a damper on our communal courage to resist the source of "evil stress".

Our emotional ground-tone may become more optimistic, whenever it begins to "resonate" in harmony with our social surroundings as a result of increased feelings of mutual trust and togetherness. Then, our communications will, invariably, consider the possibility for an improvement out of proportion to the likelyhood of its actual occurrence. The possibility of a "change for the better" is treasured and recalled, again and again, in an attitude of fond expectations, because we need to create a world, at least, in our own minds, where the situation is much better and much closer to a nostalgically remembered past. We feel guilty, when we remember, how this past was marred by internal disputes and an inevitable lack of appreciation for the blessings of our existence. Only now, do we realise, how good and fortunate those times really were.

A sense of guilt mingles with a feeling of newly found strength in togetherness. There is a greatly increased appreciation for the well-being of daily existence, as well as a nostalgic and somewhat irrealistic expectation about the likelyhood that the foreseeable future will see a return to the blessed past. These feelings seem to be the most important behavioural attitudes and adaptations of a community that is living under a measure of external stress, or "duress". The emotional synchrony of hopeful expectations becomes an essential and sustained form of stress-adaptation. Reality experiences are becoming increasingly coloured by this commonly shared emotional ground-tone, which may fluctuate between hope and despair, depending upon the duration, severity and progression of the stressful circumstances.

The attitude of emotional neutrality is, now, looked-upon with a measure of suspicion, because it tends to cloud the sharp divisions between good and evil, and, the attitude of emotional neutrality has a tendency to undermine the will to maintain the struggle for survival by questioning the definitions of right and wrong.

However, the attitude of hopeful expectations can not be sustained indefinitely, because such an attitude requires a sustained effort, or a "maintenance energy". After all, it is tiresome to resist stress continuously. If hopeful expectations are not satisfied, at least, to some extent, within a reasonable period of time; if certain, small events can not be interpreted as a justification for these hopeful expectations, discouragement and despair will, eventually, take-over, indicating a lessening of the stress-resisting forces that have to be maintained by a community under duress.

One of the most basic and obviously sound and sensible responses to the presence of a threat or a stress, is an attempt to secure help from another source in order to better resist these forces of displacement. The social organisation or integration of a group of individuals is directly based on these mechanisms of mutual assistance, and, nature has explored the advantages of the possibilities for mutual assistance, long before man became consciously aware of these possibilities. Viability becomes, then, for the socially integrated grouping, a matter of survival of the social entity as a whole, rather than the survival of a single individual.

We have elaborated several times, now, man's efforts to structure the forces he experiences around and within him in an analogy to the forces of his own conscious will, or the force-fields of the immediate social surroundings, and, we have seen, how the interpretation of the world as a system of "willed forces" helping or harming him, was an inescapable and completely logical conclusion of man's early observations. Man's desire to align himself with such anthropomorphic forces in the most advantageous way possible was entirely logical, and, the leaders of a community would try to harnass these anthropomorphic force-fields with magic manipulations and incantations, as they grasped for help and guidance in their efforts to lead their community through difficult times.

Is it not perfectly natural to resort to a prayer for help, or an attitude of atonement for past wrong-doings, whenever we find ourselves in dire circumstances? Is it not natural to suspect, that we have offended the powerful forces of nature, if we see these forces working against us? In our anthropomorphic perceptions of reality, we know, that these forces could help us, if they had the will and desire to do so.

Hopeful expectations, the crucial need for help to effect a change for the better in the prevailing circumstances, as well as a sense of guilt for the insufficient appreciation when times were good, all these factors combine to effect a powerful psychological attitude of prayer and atonement, which are an incalculable aid to survival. Yet, during prolonged and relatively mild forms of stress, this prayerful attitude of hopeful expectation and atonement loses its persuasiveness as a result of the chronic frustrations that are associated with a long and unexpected delay in the fulfillment of these hopeful expectations.

Here, the processes of critical re-evaluation and the contribution of emotionally more neutral observations are going to be increasingly useful to provide the mental precision necessary to maintain faith in the reality of certain expectations. However, the chronicity of a situation of stress, also means, that, in such long-standing but relatively mild forms of stress, the community accepts, slowly and tacitly, the status-quo as the new equilibrium, and, with this acceptance, the balance-point of the equilibrium has been changed, be it ever so slightly. There is, then, in essence, a return to reality and emotional neutrality. Life goes-on, as the status-quo becomes, slowly, "the norm". The social organism or community returns, slowly, to a behaviour in the emotionally neutral zone, even, if a ground-tone of regret, or, a vague memory of "the good old days" remains alive in certain concepts or legends that are beginning to form a valuable cultural heritage.

Throughout history, it has been obvious to man, that there is, often, an unexpected and incomprehensible delay between the fervent prayers for help and the arrival of a beneficial response from the gods. Such delays were, often, responsible for extra-ordinary severe practices of atonement and sacrifice, and, man formulated, later, many sophisticated attitudes and intellectual explanations in an attempt to accomodate for these frustrating uncertainties and delays.

Probably, the most sophisticated, most powerful and most valuable adaptation has been the attitude, or view-point, that the Divine Will takes precedence over the human will, and, that a complete trust in the wisdom and benefit of the Divine Will, is, somehow, going to be rewarded; perhaps, not in a tangible form during our life-time on earth, but, certainly, as a blissful union with the Supreme Being in a life after death.

Such an adaptation has the enormous advantage, that it can not be proven wrong. How can anyone prove, that the concept of a life after death and a blissful acceptance of the individual by his God, is an illusion? All evidence seems to indicate, that such a course of events may indeed be possible, and the testimonials of martyrs, dying for their beliefs, are a powerful and persuasive testimony, indeed.

Actually, such a form of stress-adaptation is so successful and powerful, that it often induces a resistance to stress that goes far beyond what is needed. It becomes, then, an "over-reaction", to the point of stubborn self-destruction, because the biological goal of an increase in viability has been shifted to an unassailable, eternal viability in a union with God.

This stubborn resistance is the source of many new forms of stress, tensions and incidences of violent conflict, and, we do not have to search far in history, before encountering distressing examples of stress caused by religious beliefs. The invention of the religious attitude as a powerful means to resist adversity, has led, at times, to a destructive rigidity. These rigid attitudes were destructive for the religious believer under stress, as well as for his adversaries; whenever the religious believer was in a position of power and possessed a self-righteous confidence about the absolute validity of his truths.

Where does this leave our ability to manipulate the environment on the basis of observations and beliefs that have been obtained with an attitude of emotional neutrality? Where does this powerful tool or technique fit into our behavioural adaptations to stress? Obviously, our existential security has been based, to a very large extent, on the development and use of emotionally neutral manipulative skills, and there can be little doubt, that such manipulative skills have been the basis for our unprecedented mastery over other life-forms, as well as our natural environment. Even more important is the insight, and awareness, that the emotionally neutral zone forms the basis for our ability to conceptualise and think.

Where do the capabilities of the emotionally neutral zone fit-in as a factor of stress-adaptation? We have seen, that the more severe forms of stress evoke a response in the emotional regions of the behavioural spectrum, and, the more severe and acute the force of stress, the more our response will be emotional or instinctive in nature. This points, inescapably, to the conclusion, that our manipulative skills and our mental images, based on the observations made in the emotionally neutral zone, are most effective in restoring us to our comfortable equilibrium in the minor forms of stress-adaptation, but, they are not as effective in the resistance of severe stress.

The images and skills of the emotionally neutral zone are most useful for carrying-out preventative measures or actions, where we secure our viability by anticipating and avoiding the forces of stress, long before they become strong. The foresight to avoid exposure to a stressful situation is, undoubtedly, by far the most clever and existentially viable way to deal with the forces of stress. This is a form of "opportunism", if you like, but it is highly effective, and, it has been paid-for with the price of an increased potential for "anxiety".

An increased ability to foresee what may happen, implies, by necessity, a far greater awareness of potentially dangerous developments, and, this form of "productive anxiety" mobilises the energies and measures required to take appropriate evasive action.

In order to be effective in our efforts to avoid stress, we need a high degree of precision in our anticipations, but, we do not necessarily need an absolute reliance upon the validity of our reality interpretations, or, the mental structures that let us take these appropriate avoidance reactions. They have to be reliable, but we do not have to believe that they represent an absolute truth.

Nevertheless, a sense of reliability also constitutes a "feeling of truth", just as the religious reality interpretation becomes a truth when relied-upon under severely stressful conditions. Yet, the nature of the imagery we use in an opportunistic avoidance-behaviour, or a situation of clever advantage-taking, is different from the imagery that comes into play whenever we are emotionally aroused. The emotionally neutral imagery tends to be much more flexible, because we are much less involved existentially.

However, we should not consider the emotionally neutral zone to be completely neutral. A mild anxiety has to be present, before we develop a sufficient motivation to spend our energies trying to stay out of trouble. In addition, we have to learn to extend our concerns to the people around us, because a profound insight will tell us, unmistakenly, that our viability is, ultimately, dependent upon the viability, happiness and security of the people of our social environment.

The need for the ability to trust, implicitly, a certain system of images or conceptual inter-relationships does not invalidate our search for a relativistic frame of reference, where the quality of trust is equated with the level of reliability that seems prudent under a particular set of circumstances. If we can not trust a set of images, we can not maintain a state of emotional near-neutrality, because a confused and unreliable reality perception will endanger and surprise us, time and again, evoking our existential anxieties and ruining our efforts to function in an emotionally neutral frame of mind. Such a repeated frustration of our efforts to rely upon emotionally neutral images, may well be one of the major reasons, why people drift back into fanatical religious beliefs in times of severe stress.

I am convinced that it is, intellectually and emotionally, not only, possible, but, advantageous, to "believe", strongly, in our mental images, and, I am convinced that we have to rely upon them very seriously for our behavioural decisions, and yet, we should be able to acknowledge, in the back of our minds, that the validity of our belief structures may change at any time. We may lose some of our ability to excercise a fanatically stubborn and self-destructive resistance to stress, (as we see in the absolutism of religious fervor), but, we gain in the ability to adapt flexibly, and, to accept a compromise. In particular, we gain the ability to see the point of view of our adversaries.

In the long run, this ability to see someone else's point of view and recognise someone else's legitimate needs and aspirations, will determine the viability of us all. The time has passed, that we could hope to solve a conflict of interest, or ideological difference, with ruthless persecution or death-defying acts of heroic resistance. We have to learn to avoid stressful situations by learning to curb our yearning for combat and victory.

Some loss of the ability to cope with stressful situations of utter despair, may not be too high a price to pay, certainly not, if it becomes obvious, that an increasing reliance upon observations made in the emotionally neutral zone, will help us, individually as well as collectively, to avoid getting into a desperate situation in the first place.

Therefore, the value of an attitude of relativity in conceptual imagery is utilitarian in nature, and, it reflects, in essence, a search for global compatibility and security. Our beliefs and attitudes will always be judged on their usefulness, as we attempt to cope with ourselves and our environment.

Let us hope, emotionally netural, that such ideas may find a wide-spread response, and, let us hope, that they may help us to enlarge our spheres of mutual concern, because it is the scope of our attitudes of concern, as well as the focus of these concerns, which will, ultimately, determine the destiny of the species of mankind.

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Summary

1. The importance of a belief in the truth.
   Philosophical niceties and the question of relevance.
   The trade-off between flexible tolerance and a purposeful resolve.
   The existential meaning of belief structures.
   A comparison between human and animal awareness mechanisms.
   
   
   
2. Flexibility and viability.
   Neurological systems of classification.
   The range of recognition-patterns.
   
   
   
3. Animal behaviour and awareness.
   The conditioned reflex.
   Human interpretations when analysing animal awarenesses.
   
   
   
4. The development of human awarenesses.
   Similarities and differences with animal awareness.
   The beginnings of conceptual awareness.
   
   
   
5. Communal aspects of symbolic awareness arousal.
   The difficulties of indicating the beginning of the human species.
   The importance of the frequent, voluntary recall of memory-traces.
   The need to categorise conceptual images.
   
   
   
6. A review of conceptual developments.
   Possibilities for the experience of individual variability in emotional significance.
   The basis for reflective thought.
   Discrepancies between the existential significance of the actual experience and the symbolically stimulated memory-recall.
   
   
   
7. Self-stimulation of mental image-recall.
   Later developments in the abstraction of a sense of individuality.
   The existential significance of the process of reflection.
   
   
   
8. The transition from a reaction to an awareness.
   A review of human interpretations of animal awarenesses.
   Neurological versus conceptual recognition patterns.
   The origins of anthropomorphic interpretations of reality experiences.
   
   
   
9. Continuing developments in the mechanisms of verbalisation.
   The communication of knowledge.
   The description of an unknown specific in terms of generalised qualities.
   The domestic dog and the interpretation of its behaviour.
   
   
   
10. Symbolic representations and cultural developments.
    Parallels between neurological and conceptual classification systems.
    Mobility and perception in animal organisms.
    The relative rigidity of recognition patterns.
    
    
    
11. Biological needs and animal perceptions.
    Questions of viability and variability.
    The optimum range of flexibility in patterns of recognition and adaptation.
    The enlargement of the range of perceptions.
    The variable balance between positive and negative stimuli.
    Limitations of the genetic code.
    Culture, seen as a broadened concept of non-genetically transferred codes of behaviour.
    
    
    
12. The inter-play between the perception of reality and the quality of behavioural responses.
    Feed-back mechanisms.
    Chance or inevitability in the evolutionary development of the possibilities for symbolic representation?
    
    
    
13. Neurological capabilities of classification as a pre-requisite for the function of recognition.
    The function of anticipation in the classification of events.
    The abstraction of qualities, secondary abstractions and generalisations.
    
    
    
14. Technological innovations and the possibilities for dense population concentrations.
    The independent existence of abstract qualities in our mental imagery.
    A shift in the process of learning towards the secondary transfer of mental images.
    The expectation to receive answers.
    A review of the classification of knowledge and information.
    Relationships with reliance and truth.
    
    
    
15. A comparison of religious and scientific beliefs.
    The basic scientific assumption; the essential predictability of all events.
    The logic of an anthropomorphic interpretation of reality.
    
    
    
16. The function of the attitude of hope.
    Hope and stress.
    An analysis of stress.
    Communal effects of acute and chronic stress.
    Guilt and gratitude.
    The functions and limitations of emotional neutrality.
    Hope and atonement.
    Destructive aspects of too great a stress-resistance because of religious beliefs and hopeful expectations.
    The usefulness of emotional neutrality in the prevention of stressful situations.
    A review of our need for certainty.
    The mobilisation of motivational energies.
    Some loss of resistance in coping with stress represents a fair price to pay for an increased range of understanding and emotional control.
    The emotionally neutral hope.

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